Understanding Fileless Attacks on Linux-based IoT Devices with HoneyCloud

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




20 Billion

IoT Devices
In 2023









Honeypot

A honeypot is a computer security mechanism set to detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems.




Hardware Honeypot



Remote Control Power Adapter

Hardware Honeypot

Hardware Honeypot




Hardware Honeypot

City	Device	Price	Arch
New York, USA	Raspberry Pi	\$20	ARM
San Jose, USA	Netgear R6100	\$55	MIPS
Beijing, China	BeagleBone	\$45	ARM
Shenzhen, China	Linksys WRT54GS	\$40	MIPS
All above	RCPA	\$30	-



System Architecture



Software Honeypot High Fidelity



Customizing QEMU configurations

Proper CPU, memory, and peripheral configurations



Masking sensitive system information

Forge /proc/cpuinfo



VM instances rearrangement

Change IPs and providers

Software Honeypot Evidence Collection



CPU usage




≡ Process list



Network packets

Findings **Deployment Overview**




Findings Geo-distribution



~\$6/month

108 Jun. 2017 ~ Jun. 2018

Findings General Attacking Flows






attacks that do not rely on malware files

| Findings | Hardware

14.5M 1.6M


suspicious connections effective attacks





249M 26.4M

suspicious connections effective attacks



Findings Less Fidelity

1100/day



670/day



Public clouds


may prevent certain types of attacks




In-depth information

may be used to infer the honeypots

| Findings | Hardware



Findings Software



Findings Malware-based Attacks





598 types malware 27.3%

ARM


25.7%

MIPS

Findings Fileless Attacks

Occupying end systems Stealing data e.g., altering passwords e.g., reading the shadow file Damaging system data Launching network attacks e.g., removing / altering e.g., sending malformed configurations HTTP requests Other commands Preventing monitoring e.g., killing services e.g., who, lastlog Retrieving system info No shell commands e.g., getting hardware e.g., SSH tunneling information attacks

Findings SSH Tunneling Attack




Findings

New Security Challenges & Defense Directions

- 56.2%: modify the filesystem
- 99.7%: using shell commands
- **0.3**%: no traces

Findings

New Security Challenges & Defense Directions



Conclusions & Future Work

- Build and deploy the HoneyCloud system
- First taxonomy for fileless IoT attacks

- Support of emerging IoT interfaces
- Robustness to the interference of VM identity
- In-depth analysis on advanced attacks

Thanks